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Abstract
We provide a simple model to study the U.S. government's nationwide terror alert
system. We show that the alert level will depend as much on the public's perception
of the risk of an attack as it does on the government's intelligence information. If the
public perceives an attack to be very likely or severe, they take adequate private protection
(e.g., reduction in social and economic activities) so that alert level is optimally set below
the full{information level. When the public is relatively uncertain about the nature of
an attack, then the government may put the nation on a higher alert (relative to the
full{information case), which may cause the public to become `complacent' if no attack
occurs. Our results demonstrate the challenges faced by the U.S. government and show
that the public's response to changes in the terror alert level could be partly explained by
information asymmetry.
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The September 11, 2001 attacks (hereafter 9/11) triggered new ways of dealing with security
in the U.S. Perhaps, the most signicant transformation is the creation of the Department
of Homeland Security (DHS). The DHS merges 22 existing law enforcement agencies to co-
ordinate eorts in preventing attacks and to protect Americans. The DHS also uses a security
advisory system, started in March 2002, to warn the public, state and local authorities of
potential attacks. The ve color{coded alert system consists of green for low risk, blue for
general risk, yellow for signicant risk, orange for high risk, and red for severe risk of an
attack.1 The objective of the advisory system is to inform the public in a very simple and
easily identiable way of the necessity to be extra vigilant and take adequate steps to protect
oneself against potential attacks.
This paper provides a theoretical analysis of some of the challenges faced by the DHS in
its implementation of the terror advisory system. Most Americans by now believe that the
country will remain at risk to terrorist attacks for the foreseeable future. But a poll conducted
by Opinion Dynamics Corporation one year after its implementation, showed that close to 60%
of Americans do not think the color{coded alert system is helpful. Yet, a heightened state of
alert has sometimes led to a tremendous increase in safety concerns and a subsequent drop
in participation in social activities. For example, the heightened alert on February 7, 2003
caused a lot of panic as households sought to buy items (such as duct tapes) for protection
from an attack. How can these two behaviors be reconciled? More generally, do heightened
alerts necessarily change the public behavior and attitudes towards risk of attacks? And if so,
when are these changes likely to occur?
We analyze a simple model of information asymmetry about potential attacks that can
be used to answer these, and other, questions. From its intelligence sources, the DHS learns
more about the nature or likelihood of a potential attack (beyond what the public knows)
and issues a nationwide alert to warn the public. The government has a dual objective: to
secure the nation while promoting a sustainable economic growth. The government knows
that if individuals perceive an attack to be likely or severe, then they will be less willing
to participate in social or economic activities, as they protect themselves and assets against
attacks. Keohane and Zeckhauser (2003) call this \avoidance" behavior, and they also argue
1The alert level has been at yellow for most of the time, but has been raised 5 times from yellow to orange:
September 9, 2002; February 7, March 17, May 20, and Dec 21, 2003. It was lowered from orange to yellow
on September 24, 2002; February 28, April 16, May 30, 2003 and January 9, 2004. There has been no other
terror{related incident since 9/11.
1that this could have large negative eects.2 In addition, the government will also be concerned
about how far citizens will be willing to sacrice their some civil liberties for increased safety.3
Thus, the competing demands of security and economic freedom can cause the government to
issue an alert level below what will be warranted by its information.
As a benchmark case, we rst identify the state of alert if the information about a potential
threat were publicly available. We then analyze the realistic case whereby, for obvious reasons,
information gathered by intelligence sources is not made available to the public. Under asym-
metric information, any revision to the alert level, and its impact on the public's behavior,
depends as much on underlying beliefs about acts of terrorism as it does on the DHS's intel-
ligence. For example, suppose the public believes that an attack is very likely. Then they all
take adequate measures to protect themselves, including a reduction in participation in social
and economic activities. In this case, the government may have an incentive to not confound
the public by putting the nation on a very high alert: a further heightened alert level will lead
to a further decline in social and economic activities. Hence for this range of prior beliefs,
there will be a pooling equilibrium in which the government issues a lower alert level (relative
to the full{information case), regardless of its information.
But if the public is uncertain about likelihood or severity of an attack, then any information
that can be gleaned from intelligence sources becomes very useful. In this case, the alert level
is very eective as the public responds to it as they would in the full{information case.
Finally, we also show that for intermediate priors about the nature or likelihood of an
attack, the government is more likely to put the nation on a higher alert level (relative to
the full{information case). The intuition behind this result is relatively simple: When the
government also has an incentive to promote economic activity, there is an incentive to choose
a lower alert level to assure the public of their safety (especially when security agents are well
prepared to deal with a possible attack). If the public recognized this, they may be prone to
attach lesser importance to the advisory system. This makes it dicult for the government to
use the advisory system to eectively warn the public of a potential attack. One solution is to
raise the alert level higher than what would be expected in the full{information case. However,
if adopted too often, this strategy may have the tendency of causing the public too become
2Charles Stein of the Boston Globe, puts this succinctly: \A fear tax has been levied on the economy and
[Americans] are paying it... The fear tax shows up in consumer spending, business investment, and stock prices.
Add them all and the total is signicant." (Boston Globe, February 23, 2003, pp. F1)
3For example, the USA Patriot Act, signed into law on October 26, 2001 to empower law enforcement
agencies in their eorts to prevent future attacks is seen by some critics as a blow to the civil liberties of
ordinary Americans. See also a study by Viscusi and Zeckhauser (2003) on targeted searches and passenger
screening at airports.
2complacent of an attack, in particular if no attack occurs during a heightened state of alert.
Our results therefore show that the public's response to changes in the terror alert level could
be partly explained by information asymmetry.
Our analysis therefore complements the literature on terrorism, which has largely focused on
the use of terror attacks (e.g., skyjacking, kidnaps, bombings, threat, etc) to force a government
to concede to certain demands. For example, Lapan and Sandler (1988) investigates the time
inconsistency of government's policy of never to negotiate with terrorists groups who take
hostages, while Lee (1988) examines the issue of optimal retaliation by a government in the
case of state{sponsored terrorism. In another paper, Lapan and Sandler (1993) analyzed a
signalling game in which the government is uniformed about the terrorist group's capabilities
to attack. The government learns about the group from earlier attacks and then decides
whether to ght back or concede. They showed that the government may prefer a partial{
pooling equilibrium to a never surrender equilibrium. Enders and Sandler (1993) also provide
evidence suggesting that terrorists seem to concentrate their eorts on \soft targets" whenever
security around a \hard target" is tightened. Our paper departs from this trend: our objective
is to provide an economic analysis of how the government, through a terror advisory system,
engages the public in the ght against terrorism.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 outlines a model of the terror alert
system. In section 3, we provide the equilibrium analysis, rst in a benchmark case when all
information is public and later analyze the case of private information. A brief discussion of
the main results is provided in section 4, and section 5 concludes the paper. Proofs of all
results are in an appendix.
2 A model of an alert system
We consider a society that is susceptible to a terrorist attack, and concerned about the severity
of an attack. We assume that the severity of an attack could be high (H) or low (L).4 Initially, it
is known by all that the probability that the severity of an attack will be high is p(H) = ! > 1
2:
The assumption that ! > 1
2 is consistent with the fact that most people view the society to be
at a risk to terrorist attacks.
The government then observes a private signal, s(s = high or low); about the threat level
through its intelligence sources. We assume that P(s = hjH) = P(s = ljL) =  and  > !; so
4Our results are qualitatively the same if instead we assume the severity of an attack is known, but there is
uncertainty about the likelihood of an attack. However, this alternative formulation complicates the analysis
without adding any new insights to the results.
3that the government's information is more reliable than the prior information. After assessing
its information, the government then issues an alert level A to the public. For the purpose of
tractability, we assume A is continuous, as opposed to the discrete form of the DHS's advisory
system. This assumption does not aect the nature of our results. In particular, the DHS
color{coded system could be made continuous if we add a duration component: i.e., an orange
alert can be considered higher than another if it has a longer duration.
It is assumed that individual members of the society derive utility from economic/social
activity, and that the level of utility is impacted by the severity of an attack. In particular, we
assume that the utility from a given level of activity, X; is
U =
8
> <
> :
HX if severity of attack is high;
LX; if severity of attack is low;
where L > H > 0 and  is a constant, 0 <  < 1: Thus a bad attack lowers the utility
derived from a given level of economic activity.5 There are several ways to interpret the utility
function. We can think of X as an aggregate participation in social activities (e.g., attending
a professional baseball game, where the fun at the game could be ruined if the stadium had
to evacuated due to a potential terrorist attack). Alternatively, X could be interpreted as
aggregate level of investment and U as the level of production. A severe attack therefore
disrupts productive activity and leads to very low output for any given investment level. More
generally, a low aggregate X can be thought of as private protection against potential attacks.
The increased security measures that accompanies a high alert imposes an \inconvenience
cost" on individuals. For example, if the country is on a high alert, individuals will have to
undergo lengthy security procedures or random searches when boarding a plane, attending
a sporting event (e.g., a baseball game), etc. We assume that inconvenience costs increase
exponentially in the alert level. Thus, each a member of the society chooses X to:
max
X
U = E[Sj
]X   XeA; (1)
where E[Sj
] is the individual's expectation of S given her information 
: An individual's
information set, 
; includes whatever is publicly observable and inferred from the government's
warning to the public.
Given an alert level A and individuals' beliefs about the nature of an attack, aggregate
economic activity can be determined from the representative individual's maximization prob-
lem. The rst order condition from utility maximization gives X = (E[Sj
])
1
1  e A; and the
5Notice the unconventional use of notation here stemming from our assumption that L > H: We choose this
notation to dierentiate between a low and high attack.
4(natural) logarithm of this can be normalized as
X = lnE[Sj
]   A: (2)
Society's loss from a potential terrorist attack will depend on the severity of the attack,
the aggregate level of economic activity at that time, and the preparedness of federal agents to
respond to an attack. Dene X S = lnXS; where XL > XH are constants and, for simplicity,
let X L   XH = 1: We then assume that the cost from an attack with severity S is given by

X   XS   A
2
; where  > 0 captures the nation's preparedness for an attack. So, given the
severity of an attack, S (S = H;L), it is assumed that the cost of a successful attack will be
higher if aggregate economic activity is high, and in particular, exceeds some desirable level,
XS: Secondly, security agents play a vital role both in mitigating the loss from an attack.
That is, the more prepared security agents are in dealing with an attack, the less costly (or
destructive) it is to the society. So for example, suppose security agents at a baseball game
suspect a potential attack. Then the speed with which they can evacuate fans to a safe area
can greatly reduce the losses if an attack occurs. However, such eorts can be hampered in a
sold{out game.
Notice that the cost of attack is decreasing in the alert level. This is because the government
commits more resources to detect and prevent terrorist activities if the alert level is raised: the
public may attach less credibility to a high alert if anti{terrorism activities are not increased
accordingly. For example, we observe many more checks at airports and ballparks when the
alert level is raised. We also capture the eectiveness of anti{terrorism investment with the
parameter : The higher  is, the better prepared agents are, and hence an attack will be less
costly. For example, in May 2003, the cities of Seattle and Chicago held a ve{day bioterrorism
drill that included hundreds of reghters and police ocers responding to a mock explosion
of a radioactive \dirty" bomb. Such exercises can be interpreted as increasing  in our model.6
Our formulation of the cost function can be interpreted as there being some threshold level
of activity such that it is equally costly to exceed this threshold just as it is to go below it. If
economic activity is high, the cost of an attack will also be high because more is destroyed.
On the other hand, if there is very little economic activity, then less will be destroyed. But
a relatively low stock of economic activity reduces the economy's capacity to grow. This is
6We have abstracted from budgetary considerations in the model, but this is by no means less important.
Some estimates suggests that putting the nation on a higher costs about $1 billion a week. With several states
facing a budget shortfall, resources can therefore be a constraint on eorts to prevent and/or mitigate a terror
attack. In our model, varying amounts of resources can be viewed as changing ; so that the qualitative nature
of our results is preserved without explicitly introducing a budget constraint.
5consistent with the argument in Azariadis and Drazen (1990) that economic growth is slower
below some threshold level of human capital or stock of knowledge.
Given its signal, s; the government chooses the alert to maximize the trade{o between
the benets from increased economic and social activity and the cost of an attack:
max
A
E[V js] = E[Xjs]  

2
(X   X S   A)2; (3)
where E[Xjs] is the expected level of economic activity given the signal, and  is a positive
constant. This objective function captures, in a very simple way, the government's desire to
provide security to a worried nation, but at the same time encourage everyone to go about
their business as usual.7 This implies that  can not be too low nor too high. For simplicity,
and in order to study the eects of the public's perception of terrorism risks on the alerts, we
set  = 1:
3 Equilibrium analysis
We are interested in analyzing the perfect Bayesian equilibria to the signaling game. In such
an equilibrium, the government has a welfare maximizing behavioral strategy that describes
the alert level A(!;s), taking into account the level of economic activity such a security advice
will elicit. The public's decision to undertake social or economic activity is a function of their
beliefs about the terror{related information received by the government and the alert level,
with the aim of maximizing utility.
We rst analyze a benchmark case in which all information is publicly observable, and
relate the results to the more realistic case of private information.8 To ensure that the optimal
alert levels in the full{information case has the desirable properties, we make the following
assumption:
Assumption 1: L
H < 2:
Assumption 1 guarantees that in the full{information case, the nation will be put on a higher
alert level if a high signal of an attack is observed. Secondly, given the signal observed, the
full{information alert level is higher if the public's prior about an attack is high.
7For example, citing concerns of a terrorist attack, a member of the U.S. House Select Committee on Home-
land Security, Rep. Christopher Shays of Connecticut, advised the public to consider not attending new year's
eve celebrations in New York's Times Square on Dec. 31, 2003 because \if there was panic, a lot of injuries
would take place." He was sharply criticized by the Mayor of the city of New York for instilling fear into the
public.
8In practice, the government does not disclose this information, since doing so will compromise its intelligence
sources.
6We also assume that the information gathered through intelligence sources is very infor-
mative: with almost certainty, the government sees a high signal if the threat of an attack is
high.
Assumption 2: The private signal is very informative; i.e.,  ! 1:
3.1 Equilibrium when signals are public information
Suppose that information about terrorist attacks is known by all; i.e., the government has no
private information. Then individuals' information set will be given by 
 = f!;sg and the
government's payo, if a signal s = h;l is received, will be
E[V js] = lnE[Sjs]   As  
1
2
P(Hjs)
h
lnE[Sjs]   X H   (1 + )As
i2
 
1
2
P(Ljs)
h
lnE[Sjs]   X L   (1 + )As
i2
(4)
where E[Sjs] = P(Hjs)H + P(Ljs)L; and s = h;l:
Dierentiating E[V js] w.r.t. As; and solving the rst order condition for As; gives the
rst{best alert levels to be
Ao
h(!) =
1
1 + 

lnE[Sjh]   P(Hjh)X H   P(Ljh)X L  
1
1 + 

(5)
when the signal is high; and
Ao
l(!) =
1
1 + 

lnE[Sjl]   P(Hjl)X H   P(Ljl)X L  
1
1 + 

(6)
when s = l: Subtracting (6) from (5) gives
Ao
h(!)   Ao
l(!) =
1
1 + 

P(Hjh)   P(Hjl)   ln
E[Sjl]
E[Sjh]

(7)
since it is assumed that X L   XH = 1:
By Bayes rule, P(Hjh)   P(Hjl) > 0; so that Ao
h can either be greater than or less than
Ao
l; depending on the value of L relative to H. In particular, a very large L encourages a
higher level of economic activity, especially if the publicly available information suggests a
lower threat of an attack. This however makes the society susceptible to a high degree of
destruction if an attack occurs. To mitigate this, the government issues a higher alert level if it
sees a lower threat of an attack. However throughout the analysis, we restrict parameter values
in our model so that the nation will be on a higher alert if a high threat is publicly observed, for
every value of !: We show in the following lemma that our assumption that L < 2H ensures
that Ao
h > Ao
l; and therefore helps us to capture this realistic feature into the model.
7Lemma 1 If assumptions 1 and 2 hold, then (i) Ao
h(!) > Ao
l(!) for all values of !; and (ii)
Ao
s(!) increases in !; for s = h;l:
Put dierently, Lemma 1(i) says that if information gathered from intelligence sources is
suciently reliable; i.e,  ! 1; and H is not too low (relative to L), then in the full{information
case, the nation will be on a higher alert level if the there is sucient information to believe that
the threat of an attack is high. Part (ii) of Lemma 1 says that, given the threat signal observed
by the public, the full{information alert level increases in the society's initial perception of a
terrorist attack.
Finally, by substituting Ao
h and Ao
l into equation (2), it is easy to see that a low threat
level leads to a higher economic activity. Hence, when information about an attack is known
to the government only, this may provide an incentive for the government to lower the alert
level (below the full{information level). As we shall see, such incentives exist when society
members perceive an attack to be imminent. We explore this fully in the next section.
3.2 Equilibrium when information is private
Now suppose, as it is the case, that the government does not fully disclose all of its information
and/or the source of its intelligence. The question we ask is, will the government always nd
it optimal to choose the alert level that corresponds to the full{information case?
Let the government be denoted by type{h if its private signal suggests a severe attack,
and by type{l if the signal points to a lower threat of an attack. We focus our attention on
the incentives faced by a type{h for a given prior, !; of a severe attack. We rst look for
the conditions under which a separating equilibrium exist at A 2 fAo
h(!);Ao
l(!)g: Consider
a deviation from Ao
h(!) by the type{h government. If the public incorrectly interprets this
to mean a low level of risk, then the government's net gain from deviation will be given by
  E[V jh;Ao
l]   E[V jh;Ao
h]; the dierence in payos between deviating and following the
signal. This is given by
(!) =
1
1 + 

P(Hjh)   P(Hjl) +  ln

E[Sjl]
E[Sjh]

 
1
1 + 
(P(Hjh)   P(Hjl))
 
1
2
[P(Hjh)   P(Hjl)]2
=

1 + 
ln

E[Sjl]
E[Sjh]

 
1
2
[P(Hjh)   P(Hjl)]2 (8)
The dierence in payos has two opposing terms: the rst term represents the gain from a
higher economic activity, and the second term is the cost incurred by the society if an attack
8occurs. It is easy to see how dierent values of the model's parameters change the incentive to
deviate or not. For example, since E[Sjl] > E[Sjh] for all ! > 1=2; an increase in L (relative
to H) increases the rst term on the RHS of equation (8) and thus increases the incentive to
deviate. Also, @
@ > 0; so that the incentive to deviate from the full{information alert level
increases in : as  increases, Ao
l ! Ao
h (see equation (7)) and the public will not be able to
make the distinction between a high threat from a low threat of an attack. In this case, the
government sets a lower alert level one. Intuitively, if the government is condent in the steps
taken to secure the nation, then the alert level will be lowered to assure the public.9
Proposition 1 Suppose 2e1=4   1 < L
H < e1=2 and  > 1: Then there exists some 1
2 < ! < 1;
such that the government has an incentive to:
(i) choose the full{information alert level if the public is uncertain about the threat of an attack;
i.e.  < 0 if 1
2 < ! < !; and
(ii) deviate from the full{information alert level if the public's prior belief of an attack is high;
i.e.  > 0 if ! < ! < 1:
The intuition behind Proposition 1 is very simple. The government responds to both
the public's prior perception of attack and information gathered from intelligence sources.
Proposition 1(i) says that the government adopts the full{information alert level when, ex{
ante, there is sucient uncertainty about the threat of an attack (i.e., ! < !): The reason is
that since the public and the government are very uncertain about the severity of a potential
attack, the government puts a signicant weight on its intelligence. So if a high signal is
observed, the government becomes `condent' that an attack is likely; and vice versa. Hence,
it is optimal to adopt an alert level accordingly to the signal received, and this impacts on the
public's perception of an attack and their behavior, as in the full{information case. Note that
this separating equilibrium does not depend crucially on terrorists behavior. In particular, if
terrorist decide to attack during a period of low alert level, then this will be reected in the
government's intelligence and the alert level will be revised accordingly.
9Note that there are no incentives to deviate if the government's intelligence sources shows no threat of a
severe attack. To see this, dene E[V jl;A
o
l ] to be the type{l government payo from following its signal and
setting A = A
o
l ; and let let E[V jl;A
o
h] be her payo from deviating to Ah: Then the dierence in payos between
deviating and choosing A
o
h will be given by
E[V jl;A
o
h]   E[V jl;A
o
l ] =  

1 + 
ln

E[Sjl]
E[Sjh]

 
1
2
[P(Hjh)   P(Hjl)]
2 < 0:
Hence, the type{l government never nds it optimal to set an alert level dierent from what its information
suggests. Doing so hurts the government both in lower economic activity and higher level of uncertainty.
9Part (ii) of Proposition 1 says that the government has an incentive not to implement the
full{information security advisory if ! > ! and  is suciently high. To see this, suppose
the public perceives an attack to be severe. Then a further heightened state of alert will be
economically too costly as it conrms the public's fear of an attack. Hence, if the nation's law
enforcement and security agencies preparedness for an attack is suciently high (i.e., a high
), then the government may have an incentive to set the alert level below the full{information
case in order to promote more economic activities. So the alerts levels fAo
h;Ao
lg, together, can
not form an equilibrium. The question then is: How does the government convey dierent
threats of an attack to the public?
In turns out that any attempt to resolve this dilemma also involves raising the alert level
beyond the full{information level: that is, for some range of !; the government puts the nation
on a higher state of a alert even if the signal received is low. Since such an action entails some
economic costs, it must be weighed against the benet of reducing or eliminating complacency
in the public. Hence, a higher alert level when the signal is low, must satisfy two conditions:
(i) any alert level A > Ao
l must not be `too high,' such that a type-l government nds it too
costly to implement;
(ii) at the same time, such alert level A must be high enough such that the type{h government
nds it sub{optimal to mimic this strategy.
We show in Proposition 2 (below) this strategy will be feasible if the public's prior of an
alert is not too high. For suciently high prior, the economic losses do not justify the use of
this strategy. Hence, there is a discontinuity in the warning system: for intermediate values
of !; the government over{reacts to its information and issues a higher alert (relative to the
full{information case); whereas for suciently skewed priors, there will be pooling equilibrium
in which the government keeps the alert level lower than the full{information case, regardless
of its information. However, this does not alter the public's perception of an attack and its
behavior as everyone chooses an adequate level of private protection.
We rst show that such pooling equilibrium exist, and then turn our attention to the case
of over-reaction.
3.2.1 Pooling equilibria: under-reaction to private information
Suppose ! > !: In a pooling equilibrium, the government's alert level provides no information
to the public, hence the public continue to hold their prior beliefs about the severity of an
10attack. To solve for a pooling equilibrium, we rst nd the optimal alert level that will be
adopted if the information from intelligence sources reveal a low level of threat.
The type{l problem will be to choose A to solve
max
A
E[V jl;!] = lnE[S!]   A  
1
2
P(Hjl)
h
lnE[S!]   A   X H   A
i2
 
1
2
P(Ljl)
h
lnE[S!]   A   X L   A
i2
(9)
where E[S!] = !H + (1   !)L: The optimal alert level is
A(!) =
1
1 + 

lnE[S!]   P(Hjl)X H   P(Ljl)X L  
1
1 + 

which is less than Ao
l(!):
Now consider a deviation from A(!) by the type{h government. Let the out{of{equilibrium
beliefs be given by ; i.e., Prob(S = HjA 6= A) = (!): Then the optimal deviation will be
given by
A =
1
1 + 

lnE[S]   P(Hjh)X H   P(Ljh)X L  
1
1 + 

; (10)
where E[S] = H + (1   )L:
Then as before, the type{h government's net gain from choosing A(!) rather than A will
be given by

h = E[V!jh;A(!)]   E[Vjh;A] =

1 + 
ln
 
E[Sw]
E[S]
!
 
1
2
[P(Hjh)   P(Hjl)]2; (11)
and will choose the alert level A(!) if 
h > 0:
3.2.2 Separating equilibria: over-reaction to private information
If ! > !; then any separating equilibrium must consist of the government adopting a much
higher alert level when she observes a low threat. But for this to be achievable, the two
conditions (stated in the previous section) must be satised: (i) it must be that the high A
can eectively separate the low from the high signal government; and (ii) it must be optimal
for the type{l government to implement the extra security measures.
Suppose there is some alert level A > Ao
l that satises both conditions. That is, the
government chooses this A if it sees a low signal. Now consider a deviation by a type{h from Ao
h
to this level of A; and let the net gain from doing so be given by ^ h = E[V jh;A] E[V jh;Ao
h]:
Such deviation will not be optimal if ^ h < 0:
11Similarly, the second condition requires that the type{l government nds it optimal to
implement A > Ao
l rather than pool with high{signal type at A(!) : that is, 
l = E[V jl;A] 
E[V jl;A]  0: Our second proposition shows that, if ! is not too large, then there is some
A that satises both conditions, so that a `hybrid' separating equilibria exists. For very
extreme priors, there will only be a pooling equilibrium with the alert level lower than the
full{information case.
Proposition 2 Suppose ! > !; then there exists some ! > !; such that
(i) if ! 2 (!;!); then a separating equilibrium exists in which the government chooses an alert
level, ^ A(!) (Ao
l < ^ A(!) < Ao
h), if a low signal is observed; and A = Ao
h(!) if the threat level
is high.
(ii) if ! > !, the model features a pooling equilibrium in which the government chooses an
alert level A = A(!) for all signals.
Proposition 2 establishes a very interesting result about the government's terror advisory
system and how it impacts on the public's perception of an attack. We have shown that when
! > !; the full{information terror advisory policy is no longer an equilibrium. Hence, in order
to make it more credible, it is necessary that the government raises the alert level when it sees
a low threat of attack, and ! 2 (!;!): That is, there is a `hybrid' separating equilibrium in
which the alert level is set at the full{information alert level when the signal is high, but raised
above Ao
l when the signal is low. For these ranges of ! values, the extra vigilance and lower
potential cost if an attack occurs (due to the extra security and heightened alert level) more
than osets the economic costs.
However, for extreme priors, issuing a higher alert level is costly. When everyone perceives
the threat of an attack to be high, they take adequate private protection against the perceived
risks. Given this, the government nds it optimal to issue a lower alert (relative to the full{
information level) to calm the panic{stricken public: here, the concern is that individuals will
over{protect themselves and not participate in social or economic activities. Hence, we have
pooling equilibrium in which the government issues a low alert level, A(!); regardless of its
information. Nevertheless, this does not change the public's perception of an attack, and the
level of private protection.
We illustrate this in Figure 1 below. The bold solid curve represents 1
2[P(Hjh) P(Hjl)]2;
the second term of the RHS of equation (8), and the bold dash curve is the rst term. For ! < !;
the second term dominates the rst, and hence it is optimal to adopt the full{information. The
dash-dot curve represents

1+ ln

E[S!]
E[Sjh]

; and it lies below the curve 1
2[P(Hjh) P(Hjl)]2 when
12! 2 (!;!): For this range of ! values, there are separating equilibria that consist of a higher
alert level when a low signal is observed. Finally, for suciently skewed priors, we have a
pooling equilibrium at A(!):
1
2
! ! ! 1
2
1
2 [P(Hjh)   P(Hjl)]
2

1+ ln

E[Sjl]
E[Sjh]


1+ ln

L
H

Figure 1: Illustration of Propositions 1 and 2
This diagram illustrates the impact of asymmetric information on the terror alert system.
The full{information alert level is adopted when ! < !: When ! > !; the government
chooses an alert level A
(!); regardless of its information. For intermediate priors, the
alert level is more often higher, relative to the full{information case.
The pooling equilibrium alert level has some interesting implications. First, it is worth
noting that the pooling equilibrium alert level also depends on !; and it is less than Ao
l(!): It
is also easy to see that A(!) decreases in !: dierentiating A(!) w.r.t. ! gives
@A(!)
@!
=
1
1 + 

(H   L)
!H + (1   !)L
+
(1   )
(!(1   ) + (1   !))2

; (12)
which is negative for  ! 1: So the alert level is lowered further (relative to the full{information
level) as the public becomes increasingly concerned about a potential terrorist attack. But
such assurances from the government do not change individuals' resolve to protect themselves:
aggregate economic activity is lower when the society perceive an attack as extremely likely.
That is, for ! > !;
@X (!)
@! < 0: Recall from Lemma 1 that, in the full{information case, the
13nation is always put on a higher alert level whenever the public perceives a severe attack to
be more likely. The result in (12) therefore suggests the opposite: Intuitively, the government
nds it comforting when people choose to be more vigilant and take adequate steps to protect
themselves. In such cases, the economic costs from a further heightened alert level more than
osets any gains.
Finally, dierentiating A(!) w.r.t.  gives
@A(!)
@
=  
1
1 + 
"
!(1   !)(X L   XH)
(!(1   ) + (1   !))2
#
< 0:
Recall that ! < : Hence, for a xed and suciently high !; the alert level is higher if the
intelligent information is made a little less informative. This is an interesting result: it shows
that if the public perceives an attack to be imminent, then the government would raise the
alert level, when it receives a more general intelligence information about a potential terrorist
attack.
4 Discussion of main results
Designing an eective terror alert system has several challenges. On one hand, there are
economic agents that do not want their lives to be changed completely due to risk of an attack,
as this would be seen as \giving in" to terrorists. On the other hand, there is a government
that would want the public to heed to a terror warning, so that they can be extra vigilant and
know how to protect themselves against an attack. Compounding this is the enormous task
of sieving through intelligence and knowing when to act on dierent pieces of information.10
What is clear though is that the government wants Americans to be watchful but not panicky.
But the ve{color alert system has been the object of many jokes and drawn several criti-
cisms from lawmakers and the public. Our paper shows that the information asymmetry that
lies between the public and the government, in and of itself, presents some of the challenges
faced in implementation of the terror alert system. Given that information received by the
government cannot be shared with the public (and for good reasons), the public is more likely
to attach less importance to the alerts. This means that the government may sometimes raise
the alert level beyond what it would be were intelligence information made public. This was
shown in our result in Proposition 2(i). But such a strategy can become a source of compla-
cency: even though static, our model can be used to explain why if adopted too often in a
10Some DHS worry that operatives of the terrorist networks were deliberately trying to spoof U.S. and
international intelligence networks aimed at uncovering terrorist threats by planting misinformation on lines of
communications they believed were monitored.
14dynamic context, there is a risk that the public will become blas e about repeated heightened
alerts (especially, if an attack does not occur during a heightened state of alert).11
Secondly, our results that the alert level may be set at a lower level (relative to the full
information case) even when the public's perceives an attack to be very likely can be related
to the fact that the alert level has not been raised above orange in its short history. The
main reason is that, when the public thinks an attack is imminent, they will take adequate
protection against such an attack, and this behavior is less likely to be inuenced by the state
of alert. They are also more likely to trade{o a \loss of freedom" for extra security (e.g., being
receptive to extra security at airports and other public places). Hence, the alert level will be
set below the full{information level for this range of prior beliefs of an attack. Intuitively, the
government may have an incentive not to further confound the public's anxiety by explicitly
raising the alert level. We also show that given a high prior of an attack, the alert level is set
high when the government receives a more general intelligence (i.e.,  ! !). One could use
risk aversion to explain this behavior. But even without risk aversion, our model shows that
the government might choose to raise the alert level in this case for strategic reasons.
These results, taken together, seem consistent with the fact that the alert level has never
been at blue or green since the system was instituted. So far, the lowest alert level has been
yellow. We therefore agree with Mr. Tom Ridge, the Secretary of the DHS, for suggesting that
it could be decades before the government would be able to lower the threat alert to green.
5 Conclusion
The events on 9/11 has signicantly changed the way many governments now view terrorism,
and has triggered new strategies to deal with terrorism. As a way of engaging the public in
its strategies, the government devised a security advisory system to inform the public of when
to be extra vigilant. It can probably be argued that the terror alert system will continue to
be an integral part of the U.S. government's eorts to crack down on terrorism. But these
innovations have also raised concerns about the line between security and civil liberties. With
this background, this paper attempts to provide an economic analysis of how the government,
through a terror advisory system, engages the public in the ght against terrorism.
We show that a full{information alert policy, which prescribes a higher alert level both when
the intelligence sources indicate a higher threat and when the public is fearful of such attacks,
11Indeed, strong criticisms by counter{terrorism experts, and much of the public, led the DHS to revamp the
system in September 2003. Tougher internal guidelines must now be met for raising the alert level.
15may not be implemented all the time. When the public perceives an attack to be very likely,
then a further heightened alert level can cause an enormous panic in the society and substantial
reduction in participation in both social and economic activities. That is, individuals over{
protect themselves from any possible attack. So a relatively lower alert level will be adopted to
encourage more economic participation, especially if extra vigilance is also seen as \giving in"
to terrorists. Lakdawalla and Zanjani (2002) also argued that the the idea of not \giving in"
to terrorists can be used as a justication for government subsidies in terror insurance. They
argue that without such subsidies, individuals will over{invest in self{protective behavior and
this may be bad for \national prestige."12
Finally, we also nd that in order to make the advisory system more credible, the govern-
ment may also decide to raise the alert level (above the full{information level) to avoid the
public being complacent of an attack. Our results can therefore be used to shed some light
on alerting the public of potential attacks, and how such alerts changes, or not, the public's
perception of terrorism and participation in both economic and social activities.
12See also Brown, Kroszner and Jenn (2002) for a more thorough analysis of the case for federal intervention
in the market for insurance against terrorism.
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Proof of Lemma 1:(i) Using Bayes' rule, P(Hjh) =
!
!+(1 !)(1 ) and P(Hjl) =
!(1 )
!(1 )+(1 !):
Hence in the limit as ! ! 1;
lim
!1;!!
[P(Hjh)   P(Hjl)] = 1=2 and lim
!1;!!
ln
E[Sjl]
E[Sjh]
= ln
L + H
2H
:
Secondly, @
@w (P(Hjh)   P(Hjl)) =
(1 )(2 1)(1 2!)
(P(h)P(l))2 < 0; where P(s) is the unconditional
probability of observing a signal s(s = h;l): Hence P(Hjh) P(Hjl) falls in ! and maximized
at ! = 1
2 with [P(Hjh)   P(Hjl)]j!=1=2 = 1: Again, dierentiating ln
E[Sjl]
E[Sjh] w.r.t. !; we get
@
@w
ln

E[Sjl]
E[Sjh]

=
(L   H)
E[Sjh]

@
@w
(P(Hjh)   P(Hjl))  
(E[Sjl]   E[Sjh])
E[Sjl]
@P(Ljl)
@w

>
L   H
E[Sjh]

@
@w
(P(Hjh)   P(Hjl))

since
@P(Ljl)
@w < 0 and E[Sjl]   E[Sjh] > 0 for all !: So, ln
E[Sjl]
E[Sjh] attains a maximum at some
! > 1=2 (when P(Hjh)  P(Hjl) is decreasing). Combining this with the limiting points, it is
easy to see that if ln L+H
2H < 1
2; then P(Hjh)   P(Hjl) > ln

E[Sjh]
E[Sjl]

; for all values of !; and
Ao
h(!) > Ao
l(!): But this holds if L
H < 2 < 2e1=2   1.
(ii) Dierentiating Ao
s(!) with respect to ! gives
@Ao
s
@w
=

1
1 + 

(1   )
(P(s))2E[Sjs]
[H   (L   H)P(Hjs)]
>

1
1 + 

(1   )
(P(s))2E[Sjs]
[2H   L]
By assumption 1,
@Ao
s
@w > 0: Hence, the full{information alert levels will be increasing in !: qed
Proof of Proposition 1: (i) Since lim!1;!! ln
E[Sjl]
E[Sjh] = ln L+H
2H and lim!1;!![P(Hjh) 
P(Hjl)]2 = 1
4; the limit as ! ! 1 of equation (8) will be given by
lim
!1;!!1 
(!) =

1 + 
ln
L + H
2H
 
1
2

1
4

:
Therefore, if ln L+H
2H > 1
4; which implies that L
H > 2e1=4   1; then lim!1;!! (!) 
1
4


1+   1
2

which is positive if  > 1: Secondly, for ! close to 1
2; we have lim!1;!! 1
2 ln
E[Sjl]
E[Sjh] =
ln L
H and lim!1;!! 1
2[P(Hjh)   P(Hjl)]2 = 1: Hence, if ln L
H < 1
2; which implies that
L
H < e1=2; then lim!1;!! 1
2 (!) < 0 for all : This implies that there must be some ! = !
such that  < 0 if ! < !:
17(ii) The proof of part (i) shows that for all other values of !,  < 0 if 2e1=4   1 < L
H < e1=2
and  > 1: qed
Proof of Proposition 2:(i) Let ^ h = E[V jh;A] E[V jh;Ao
h] be a type-h government's gain
from deviating from the high alert level by announcing the alert level A, where Ao
l < A < Ao
h:
Then a deviation will not be optimal if ^ h < 0: This condition becomes
ln

E[Sjl]
E[Sjh]

  (A   Ao
h) 
1
2
P(Hjh)
h
lnE[Sjl]   A   X H   A
i2
+
1
2
P(Ljh)
h
lnE[Sjl]   A   X L   A
i2
 
1
2

1
1 + 
2
 
1
2
P(Hjh)P(Ljh): (13)
However, for any the alert level Ao
l < A < Ao
h to be feasible, it must be that the type{l
government nds it optimal to implement it rather than pool with high{signal type at A(!) :
that is, 
l = E[V jl;A]   E[V jl;A]  0; or
ln

E[Sjl]
E[S!]

  (A   A) 
1
2
P(Hjl)
h
lnE[Sjl]   A   X H   A
i2
+
1
2
P(Ljl)
h
lnE[Sjl]   A   X L   A
i2
 
1
2

1
1 + 
2
 
1
2
P(Hjl)P(Ljl): (14)
Dene H = lnE[Sjl]   A   X H   A and L = lnE[Sjl]   A   X L   A: Then subtracting
the inequality (14) from (13) gives
ln

E[Sw]
E[Sjh]

  (A   Ah) 
1
2
[P(Hjh)   P(Hjl)]

2
H   2
L

 
1
2
[P(Hjh)P(Ljh)   P(Hjl)P(Ljl)]
=
1
2
(P(Hjh)   P(Hjl))
h
2lnE[Sjl]   (X H + XL) 
2(1 + )A]  
1
2
[P(Hjh)P(Ljh)   P(Hjl)P(Ljl)]
This implies that
A  A 
1
2(1 + )

2lnE[Sjl]   (X H + XL)  
P(Hjh)P(Ljh)   P(Hjl)P(Ljl)
P(Hjh)   P(Hjl)
 
2
1 + 
0
@
 ln

E[S!]
E[Sjh]

P(Hjh)   P(Hjl)
+ 1
1
A
3
5
18since ln

E[Sw]
E[Sjh]

 (A  Ah) = 1
1+

 ln
E[Sw]
E[Sjh] + (P(Hjh)   P(Hjl)

: But for A to be part of
a separating equilibrium, it must be that Ao
l < A: That is,
2
1 + 
0
@
ln

E[S!]
E[Sjh]

P(Hjh)   P(Hjl)
1
A <

P(Hjh)   P(Ljh)  
P(Hjl)P(Ljl)   P(Hjh)P(Ljh)
P(Hjh)   P(Hjl)

= P(Hjh)   P(Hjl)
Hence, there exists an ^ A > Ao
l that satises both constraints i

1 + 
ln

E[S!]
E[Sjh]

<
1
2
[P(Hjh)   P(Hjl)]
2 : (15)
We know from Proposition 1 that

1+ ln

E[Sjl]
E[Sjh]

> 1
2 [P(Hjh)   P(Hjl)]
2 if ! > !: But since
E[S!] < E[Sjl]; 8!; it implies that there exists some !; such that the inequality in (15) holds
when ! < ! < !: That is, there exists a hybrid separating equilibrium, involving a higher alert
lever ^ A(!) > Ao
l if the signal is low, and ! < ! < !:
(ii) Let ! < ! < 1
2; and suppose that the public's beliefs about the risk of an attack is given by
Prob(HjA 6= A) = (!): Then optimal deviation ;A; from A is as given in equation (10).
We rst show that A 6< A: Notice that
A   A(!) =
1
1 + 
 
P(Hjh)   P(Hjl)   ln
E[Sw]
E[S]
!
For suciently skewed priors (in particular ! ! 1), we have P(Hjh)   P(Hjl) ! 1=2: Hence
A  A(!)  1
1+

1
2   ln
E[Sw]
E[S]

: Suppose  = 0 | the most favorable case for any deviation
below A: Then for ! ! 1; we get A < A(!) i 1
2 < ln(H=L) or L
H < e 1=2: But this violates
the condition that L
H  2e1=4   1; stated in Proposition 1. Hence A 6< A:
Next, we know (from equation (11)) that a pooling equilibrium exists if

h = E[V!jh;A]   E[Vjh;A] =

1 + 
ln
 
E[Sw]
E[S]
!
 
1
2
[P(Hjh)   P(Hjl)]2 > 0:
We also know that E[S!] > E[Sjh]; 8!: So for ! > !; we can choose   P(Hjh) such that the
above inequality holds. Hence, a pooling equilibrium at A(!) when ! > ! can be supported
with out{of{equilibrium beliefs given by Prob(HjA 6= A) = (!)  P(Hjh): That is, for these
values of !; the public perceives the likelihood of a severe attack to be at least P(Hjh) when
an alert level A > A is announced. qed.
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